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ABSTRACT
For several decades, global climate change has been an issue addressed in both
national and international debates. While much of the rest of the world has adopted a
number of treaties aimed at addressing global climate change, the United States has
consistently lagged behind its peers. An examination of poll responses, Senate
statements, and editorials determined that a number of factors may be causing this effect.
Specifically, a disconnect between the public and the scientific community, a political
system that has made the question one of elites versus the masses, and a historical
tendency for the federal government to prioritize security and economic issues above all
others help explain the United States’ policy response.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades the issue of global climate change has at various points
been discussed at international political and scientific summits, election rallies, movie
theatres and bookstores. Thousands of pages have been written on the topic in scientific
journals, and hundreds of pages of treaties have been penned to address the issue. In
2007, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change shared the Nobel Peace Prize
with former Vice President Al Gore for their work in addressing climate change and
making it a topic of public discourse, and Mr. Gore’s film An Inconvenient Truth won the
2007 Academy Award for Documentary Feature.
All of this attention, particularly among mass publics in many countries, means
that, unlike many other policy issues, the debate over global climate change has been
watched much more closely than many other discussions over international and national
policy. This creates an interesting dynamic, where all Americans feel a direct connection
to the issue. While other issues have the potential to affect the nation’s economy, the
world’s health, and global political environment, there are few cases where policy makers
have used these potential effects to appeal to mass opinions.
Under these conditions, nations around the world have created a number of treaty
structures aimed at reducing global emissions of gases linked to global warming.
Although the United States has involved itself in a number of these systems, its
involvement has been conspicuously less than that of other nations that have similar
levels of development. The most significant treaty that the United States has failed to
ratify is the Kyoto Protocol. America’s failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol has resulted
in significant criticism from the international community, but it still lacks support among
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the American people and the Senate. To date, there seems to be no clear understanding
of why this is the case. This paper attempts to examine the American political system
and look at how the views of its two constituent groups, the mass public and elites, have
influenced the American policy making apparatus in shaping American foreign policy on
global climate change. It seeks to do so by examining how these groups are in turn
affected by America’s history and political traditions.
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I. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
The study of Earth science, like all scientific disciplines, is a constantly changing
one. As time has progressed the models used to describe the climate of the Earth have
become increasingly complex. Early scientists tried to divide the study of the
environment into a study of the atmosphere and the earth. Current models are based on
the understanding that oceans, forests, and human activities can profoundly shape the
environment. One method of attempting to understand these interactions resulted in the
development of the greenhouse gas model.
The theory behind the greenhouse gas effect was first developed in the mid-to-late
nineteenth century, after the 1824 observation that the atmosphere naturally had
greenhouse properties (Brown 2002). Scientists observed that heat from sunlight could
pass more readily through the atmosphere than other types of heat and that complex
molecules like CO2 blocked the passage of heat more than simple diatomic molecules
like O2 (Le Treut et al. 2007), and by the end of the century they began making quantified
predictions on how changes in CO2 levels could affect the Earth’s temperature (Brown
2002). Increases in the average temperature of the Earth’s surface have been observed
over the last hundred years, and the Earth’s temperature has been predicted to increase by
1.8º to 4º Celsius by the end of the century. This temperature difference has the potential
to drastically change the Earth’s environment, affecting sea levels, weather patterns, and
animal life.
Radiation from the Sun strikes the earth. Some of this is reflected by atmospheric
gases, some is absorbed by the atmosphere, and some strikes the surface of the earth,
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where most of it is absorbed and some is reflected back. The energy that is absorbed by
the atmosphere and the Earth can later be reemitted. The relative rates of these energy
transfers determine the Earth’s temperature (Kiehl and Trenberth 1997).
Certain molecules are known to absorb the energy being emitted or reflected by
the Earth, and these molecules disperse that energy into the atmosphere. These
molecules are capable of absorbing wavelengths of light in the infrared portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum, then moving into an excited energy state, before releasing it.
Although the majority of the light that strikes these molecules in the atmosphere is
traveling perpendicular to the Earth’s surface, the energy is dispersed in all directions
rather than continuing in its normal path into space.
A number of chemicals have been implicated as being of importance in this
process. Perhaps the most important and well known is carbon dioxide (CO2). Carbon
dioxide is a chemical that is a product of the oxidation of organic molecules, a process
that occurs naturally in all living beings as sugar and fat molecules are metabolized for
energy. It is also released in the burning of fossil fuels. Atmospheric levels of CO2 can
be affected by changes in land use. Carbon sinks are environments that can absorb large
amounts of carbon, such as new growth forests. As these are created and destroyed they
can affect atmospheric levels of CO2. Global concentrations of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere have risen markedly from a pre-industrial level of 280 parts per million
(ppm) to a 2005 level of 379 ppm. Ice core samples show that historically, over the past
650,000 years, concentrations have ranged from 180 ppm to 300 ppm (Le Treut et al.
2007).
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In addition to CO2, nitrous oxide (N2O), chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), water, and
methane (CH4), which is believed to be converted to CO2, are all gases that can result in
this process of absorbing and reemitting energy. Data from 2002 suggest that CO2
contributes 64% to global warming, CH4 contributes 19% to global warming, and N2O
contributes 6% to global warming. These three chemicals account for roughly 89% of
global warming due to the greenhouse gas effect. N2O is a byproduct of certain industrial
processes and fertilizer use, and CH4 is primarily an agricultural byproduct. Like CO2
levels, atmospheric levels of CH4 and N2O have also risen substantially from preindustrial levels (Cushman and Jones 2002).
The idea that these gases can trap energy in the atmosphere in the form of heat is
largely uncontested. In the United States, controversy still remains as to the impact that
human actions have had on the climate (anthropogenic climate change) and how much of
the currently observed changes in world temperatures are instead due to natural cycles of
global warming and cooling. The American Association of Petroleum Geologists’
(AAPG) statement on climate change, which was last revised in June of 2007, states
“Certain climate simulation models predict that the warming trend will continue….
AAPG respects these scientific opinions but wants to add that the current climate
warming projections could fall within well-documented natural variations in past climate
and observed temperature data” (Climate Change 2007). Similarly the American
Geological Institute’s statement on Global Climate Change, adopted in 1999, states that
“Further research is also required to evaluate the relative impact of human activity on
global climate and the interaction of such activity with the underlying natural processes.
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In particular, studies are needed to better understand past rapid climate change and
sequestration of carbon in rock, soil, and biomass” (Global Climate Change 1999).
One of the primary arguments used to support the claim that natural cycles affect
global temperatures is that using ice cores and rock samples, geologists have determined
there has been a pattern of global warming and cooling in the Earth’s history. Much of
this pattern has been attributed to Milankovitch cycles. These cycles describe changes in
the orientation of Earth’s axis with respect to the sun, changes in the shape of the Earth’s
orbit due to the gravitation forces of other planets acting on the Earth, and the movement
of the Earth’s axis of rotation around the Earth. These cycles mean that at different
points in time, the Earth, and particular points on it, can be closer to or farther from the
sun, therefore receiving different concentrations of sunlight, which can in turn result in
changes in global temperature.
These three Milankovitch cycles can take tens of thousands to hundreds of
thousands of years to complete and depend on a variety of factors including the
gravitational pull of other planets acting on the earth. By examining how these cycles
have interacted with one another one can predict past cycles of global warming and
cooling that match with data taken from ice samples on a geological time scale. Using
geological evidence, it has been determined by Hays et al. (1976) that these cycles “are
the fundamental cause of the succession of Quaternary ice ages.” However, the authors
point out that their model predicts a long-term trend towards glaciations of the Northern
Hemisphere over the next several thousand years, when anthropogenic effects are
ignored.
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Additionally, there is evidence that suggests that the temperature of the Sun has
increased over the past several decades, and deviation in temperatures seems to be
correlated to solar activity (Khilyuk and Chilingar 2004). Similarly, fluctuations in the
amount of solar radiation hitting the Earth’s surface have been shown to have undergone
a period of global dimming from 1950 to 1990, as a decreased amount of solar energy
reached the surface of the earth and a period of global brightening from 1990 to 2002 as
an increased amount of solar energy reached the surface of the earth (Wild 2009).
Finally, a new theory has been proposed by scientists from the University of
Southern California. They note that since the early 1980s carbon release into the
atmosphere due to fossil fuel burning, the primary cause of anthropogenic emissions, has
hit a plateau, yet the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has continued to increase.
(Khilyuk and Chilingar 2004). They argue that the greenhouse gas effect is occurring, to
a limited extent, but that the amount of CO2 entering the atmosphere through human
action is negligible compared to the effects of CO2 and CH4 entering the atmosphere
through geological processes, which can release CO2 into the ocean, where, as
temperatures rise, it becomes more likely to enter the atmosphere. The increase in
atmospheric CO2 concentrations is primarily the effect of the increase in global
temperatures, rather than the cause.
Scientific discussions such as these would have been unlikely to enter into the
policy world, had they arisen before the second half of the twentieth century. Although
America had a history of environmentalism arising in the late nineteenth century, it was
not until the 1960s that the idea of invisible chemical pollution was brought to the
attention of the general populace, notably through Rachael Carson’s 1962 work Silent
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Spring (Kevles 2008). The 1960s and 1970s saw this type of environmental issue
become a matter of public concern, and in the late 1970s, world governments began to
increasingly address issues of environmental concern. In the United States, a series of
legislation was passed, notably including the Clean Air Act in 1970 and the Clean Water
Act of 1977. Additionally, in 1970, President Nixon issued an executive order creating
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by merging together several smaller
federal agencies. In 1983, the United States and Europe met to discuss regulation of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), which had been shown to be contributing to the depletion of
the ozone layer. These negotiations lead to the 1987 Montreal Protocol which sought to
phase out CFCs from use entirely.
After almost two decades of substantial advances in environmentalism, in 1988
the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), a United Nations organization, and the
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) established the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC). The program was endorsed and given a mission by United
Nations General Assembly Resolution 43/53 (United Nations General Assembly 1988).
The IPCC is tasked with reviewing and assessing “The state of knowledge of the science
of climate and climatic change”; “Programmes and studies on the social and economic
impact of climate change, including global warming”; “Possible response strategies to
delay, limit or mitigate the impact of adverse climate change”; “The identification and
possible strengthening of relevant existing international legal instruments having a
bearing on climate” and “Elements for inclusion in a possible future international
convention on climate” (United Nations General Assembly 1988). Although the IPCC
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performs no environmental research directly, global researchers voluntarily submit their
work to the IPCC for review.
This global movement continued in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), also known as the “Earth Day Summit,” in
Rio de Janeiro. Here the future “international convention on climate” which the IPCC
was tasked with looking into was introduced as the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change. The objective of the convention was to “achieve, in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change 2002). The UNFCCC also set voluntary emission
reduction targets for developed countries to achieve by the year 2000.
In addition to setting targets, the UNFCCC established a mechanism for handling
future negotiations and goals. The governing body for the UNFCCC is the Conference of
Parties, which has met fifteen times since 1995. Meetings of the Conference of Parties
have served to set international policy on climate change and express the views of world
governments on the matter. Many of the Conferences have gained international attention,
from the Third Conference of the Parties in Kyoto, Japan in 1997 to the Fifteenth
Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2009.
In 1997 the parties to the UNFCCC meet in Kyoto, Japan. There they adopted the
Kyoto Protocol on December 11. The distinguishing aspects of the Kyoto Protocol were
that it set specific targets for the reduction or limitation of greenhouse gases in 37
developed countries (Annex I countries). Specifically, the treaty sought to reduce global
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emissions of greenhouse gases to 5.2 percent less than 1990 emissions levels by the year
2012. This treaty entered into force on February 16, 2005, and the first period for
compliance is from 2008 to 2012. Internationally, the protocol, which has met with
mixed success, has come to be seen as the standard for action on international climate
change. It is important to note that the United States has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol,
even though in November 1998, the treaty was signed by the acting Ambassador to the
United Nations on behalf of the United States as part of an effort to endorse the “broad
concepts” of the treaty and to keep the United States in the negotiation process
(Executive Office of the President of the United States 1998).
Despite its large number of signatories, the Kyoto Protocol has a number of
characteristics that have resulted in criticism of the treaty, both in the United States and
internationally. First, the treaty did not include mandatory limitations on emissions for
developing countries, something many feel is important for a successful treaty.
Additionally, the 1990 date used for calculating baseline emissions under the Kyoto
Protocol was viewed by some as unfair because it was seen as favoring nations that had
suppressed levels of emissions following 1990, particularly those nations that had been
part of the Soviet Union, where the government subsidized industry in the lead up to its
collapse. Under Kyoto, these nations are allowed to significantly increase their emissions
(Medelsohn 2005). Finally, many major Annex I signatories have failed to meet their
emission reduction goals during the first phase of implementation of the Kyoto Protocol
(Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2004).
Before the Kyoto Protocol could be sent to the Senate for ratification, the Senate
passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution, by a vote of 95-0. The resolution stated that the Senate
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would not ratify any treaty that would result in serious harm to the American economy, or
included specific emission caps for developed countries but not developing countries
(U.S. Congress 1997). Subsequently, neither the Clinton administration nor the Bush
administration sent the treaty to the Senate for ratification.
In contrast, in January 2006, the United States joined with five other nations in the
creation of the Asia-Pacific Partnership (APP) on Clean Development and Climate.
Unlike the Kyoto protocol the APP does not involve setting binding limits on members;
instead, it focuses on sharing strategies for development and clean energy reduction, and
promoting technologies that could help achieve the organization’s vision of
“advance[ing] clean development and climate objectives, recognizing that development
and poverty reduction are urgent and overriding goals internationally” (Asia Pacific
Partnership on Clean Development and Climate 2007). The focus on development and
recognition of different needs played favorably with the founding members of the APP,
which included India and China, who, although signatories to Kyoto, have historically
opposed binding emissions limits for developing countries, and Australia, who had not at
that point ratified the Kyoto protocol.
In 2007, the Climate Security Act of 2007, or the Lieberman-Warner bill, was
introduced in the United States Senate. This was the first serious attempt at imposing
specific limitations on America’s greenhouse gas emissions and was a unilateral effort.
The bill proposed establishing a cap and trade system, where companies would be given a
limit on the amount of greenhouse gases that they could emit and could buy any
emissions that they needed to make up a shortfall from companies that did not reach their
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cap. The bill’s objective was to decrease annual emissions to 63 percent below 2005
levels by the year 2050. After passing through committee, the bill died in the Senate.
While many nations have been willing to sign onto a number of these
international efforts, and although it has long been involved in international negotiations
on the matter, the United States has a reputation for consistently lagging behind the rest
of the developed world in both promoting limits on greenhouse gas emissions and
ratifying treaties, particularly when any treaty involves binding caps on emissions. At the
same time, three different presidential administrations have remained active in
negotiations regarding global climate change treaties. In order for the United States and
the rest of the world to move forward on the issue, an understanding of why the United
States has opposed Kyoto-like treaties must be developed.
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II. EXPLAINING AMERICAN RESPONSES
Three major theories have been espoused to explain why the United States has
been historically reluctant to join the international community in setting specific targets
for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. These theories draw on American
historical and political tradition, claiming that these traditions shape modern political
decisions. Richard Hofstadter comments that Americans tend to frame their debates in
the language of the past, and he writes that “The range of ideas…which practical
politicians can conveniently believe in is normally limited by the climate of opinion that
sustains their culture” (1948). Political tradition can, therefore, be viewed as those limits
on American political ideas that have been established by America’s past debates and
experiences, which provide common ground for political cooperation. In the discussion
of global climate change policy some of these limits include a tradition of unilateralism, a
tradition of limited federal government with specific priorities, and a tradition of mistrust
of the elites.
In order to address these theories, a number of distinctions must be made. First, a
distinction must be made between elite and mass political behavior. The first group is
made up of politicians, noted academics, and senior civil servants. Elites have a direct
impact on the policy making process. In contrast, mass opinion tends only to impact the
nation’s policy tangentially. Elite views tend to be easy to access in terms of their
individual actions and statements, most notably as they apply to specific policy decisions.
From what they say and do, generalizations can often be drawn. In contrast, the size and
nature of the masses, and their information levels, make it difficult to directly access their
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views. Instead, generalizations are most readily drawn by examining the responses of
representative groups to poll questions.
Although a distinction between them will be made in order to in assist the analysis
of America’s responses to various treaties, these groups cannot be viewed as entirely
separate. The masses can significantly influence the policy making apparatus as political
leaders respond to polls and focus groups. At the same time, these leaders can shape the
views of the masses by how they frame and cover the debate, as members of the public
base their opinions on the views of established elites (Zaller 1992). Additionally, within
each group, there are individuals with differing degrees of knowledge and interest related
to a given matter (Berinsky 2009, Zaller 1992). Furthermore, even well known
academics can find themselves excluded from the decision making process if the policy
making apparatus chooses to circumvent them.
Members of the elite influence the masses as they give cues to the public which
influence public opinion (Berinsky 2009, Darmofal 2005, Zaller 1992). These cues can
come from both sides of an issue, and how cues are used by the masses is often linked to
party affiliation. If both sides of an issue are vocal in expressing their opinions, members
of the public tend to adopt the views of those elites that they respect or share a party
affiliation with. If only one side is vocal, members who do not share a party affiliation
with them tend to automatically adopt the other side of the issue (Berinsky 2009, Zaller
1992). In the United States, this can result in issues becoming polarized in the two-party
system where parties incorporate view points into their ideologies in an effort to maintain
or develop a majority (Key 1965, 154).
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While governments and elites can influence the views of the masses, the public
can also influence government action. As American leaders, and the ruling party in
particular, claim to get their authority from the public, they may be compelled to act
based on public opinion, and any failure to act in accordance with public opinion on a
matter can result in the government facing repercussions from the public (Key 1965, 14).
To an equal if not greater degree government must also pay attention to those views of
the general public that are accepted and established as custom and unlike public opinion
are unlikely to change rapidly (Key 1965, 12). However, public views are only effective
at changing who holds power if there is a group on the outside that the masses prefer,
which is capable of taking power (Key 1965, 556), returning to the issue of the two party
system. The two-party system allows for groups to hold different views on issues and
helps to ensure that government does not collapse when the public disagrees with the
ruling majority (Key 165, 556).
It is clear that both the elites and the public can influence the process used to
determine America’s foreign policy decisions. The models provided also suggest that the
very relationship between the elites and the masses has the potential to affect the way that
the debate around global climate change treaties progresses, as partisanship plays a role
in the decision making process. If people tend to readily adopt views that cross partisan
lines this would be less relevant, but members of the public develop their partisan
affiliations early in life and tend not to sway from them much over their lifetimes
(Breninsky 2009, 67). Furthermore, the system seems predisposed to divide issues along
partisan lines, suggesting a model for how the issue of global climate change might be
treated by both the elites and members of the public.
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Currently, a number of theories attempt to address the issue of American behavior
surrounding the ratification of treaties aimed at addressing global climate change. Three
primary theories will be examined here. The first revolves around the claim that this
trend is an extension of American unilateralism, which can be seen across the board in
America’s treatment of all international agreements, not just environmental ones. The
second argues that Americans view it as the role of the federal government to deal with
matters of international security and the economy, and global climate change is not
associated with these functions, so it is not considered a priority of the federal
government. Finally, the third argument is that Americans are inherently more skeptical
of what is perceived as a scientific elite than individuals are in other parts of the world.
Each of these theories arises from the belief that American history and its collective past
shape the nation’s current actions (Hofstadter 1948).
From the earliest days in American history, there is evidence of a belief that
involvement with the rest of the world is not beneficial to the American cause. Some of
the earliest roots of this belief are articulated famously in Washington’s Farewell
Address. Although originally written in 1796, it has continued to hold a prominent place
in American government and was read annually in the House of Representatives from
1862 to 1984 and has been read annually in the Senate since 1899. In this address, the
retiring president urged the American people while acting “in extending our commercial
relations [with foreign nations] to have with them as little political connection as
possible” (U.S. Congress 2000b). These sentiments, which were echoed by many other
prominent early American leaders, notably Jefferson’s 1801 inaugural address which
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introduced the term “entangling alliances” to America’s foreign policy language, helped
shape American policy through the twentieth century (Legro 2000).
This belief is evident in an American mythos which holds that during the first half
of the twentieth century the nation was thrust by aggressor states into the two world wars.
Although this ultimately resulted in the United States being a founding and influential
power in the creation of the United Nations, during this process the United States never
joined the League of Nations, even though the system came about largely through the
advocacy of President Woodrow Wilson. As the century progressed, America became
one of the two poles in the world power structure, as it countered the influence of the
USSR. Through programs such as the Marshall Plan and the policy of containment, the
United States became increasingly involved in world affairs politically, monetarily, and
militarily. However, despite these moves, Wilsonian ideals seem to serve as a source of
rhetoric for those who are out of office rather than those actively involved in the policy
making apparatus (Thompson 1980).
Even with this addition of a new component to the American policy scene, it can
be argued that the tradition of unilateralism still holds strong in the American mindset.
According to a 2009 Pew report, a record high 44 percent of the American population
agreed with the statement “Since the U.S. is the most powerful nation in the world, we
should go our own way in international matters, not worrying too much about whether
other countries agree with us or not” (The Pew Research Center For The People and The
Press 2009d; hereafter Pew). This mindset can be illustrated in past American treaty
involvement. Although it has been continuously active in the policy machinery that helps
to develop international treaties, the United States has often decided to not sign them.
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For example the Ottawa Treaty, which banned the use of land mines, has 156 parties
(United Nations Treaty Collection 2010; hereafter UNTC), and while the United States
has long been a leader in promoting a landmine-free world (Kitchen 2001), it is
conspicuously not a signatory. Similarly, under President Clinton, the United States
actively promoted the idea of an international criminal court, yet the same administration
which was involved in the negotiation process decided not to submit the treaty for
ratification (Wedgwood 1998), which has 111 ratifying parties (UNTC 2010).
Furthermore, the United States was actively involved in creation of the Antarctic Treaty,
the United Nations Common Law of the Sea, and the development of the concept
Common Heritage of Mankind, yet has failed to ratify any of these policies (Brown 2002,
Chayes 2008).
In a close parallel to the case of global climate change, the United States has
signed non-binding treaties aimed at addressing sulfur dioxide emissions, but not treaties
that contain mandated limits or timelines. Sulfur dioxide, like many greenhouse gases, is
produced through a number of industrial processes. When sulfur dioxide enters the
atmosphere, the nitrogen dioxide there can serve as a catalyst in the reaction which
results in its conversion to sulfuric acid, which then results in acid rain. Since 1979,
fifty-one nations, including the United States, have become parties to the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, which recognized the problem
of emissions that had the potential to have effects across national boundaries, and
particularly noted the need to investigate limiting the emissions of sulfur compounds
(UNTC 2010). The treaty also called for cooperation in research and sharing
information.

18

Six years later, in 1985, the parties to the convention meet in Helsinki and
adopted The Protocol to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on
the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or their Transboundary Fluxes by at least 30 per
cent. This treaty, which contained specific and binding targets, was not ratified by the
United States (UNTC 2010). However, the federal government, through the
Environmental Protection Agency, took action aimed at cutting sulfur dioxide emissions,
primarily through the Acid Rain Program, and between 1980 and 2008, reduced sulfur
dioxide emissions by 36 percent between 1990 and 2002 (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency 2009). All of these factors have led to the suggestion that the United States’
unwillingness to ratify global climate change is part of a broader trend in America’s
foreign policy that opposes the ratification of treaties in general, and instead Americans
are more likely to take action on their own. While unilateralist action is not unique to the
United States, the degree to which the United States engages in unilateral activities is far
greater than most other states (Chayes 2008).
Additionally, other claims as to why Americans have not ratified international
climate change legislation can similarly be found by looking to American political
tradition. Notably, one can look to American tradition to find the basis of the claim that
the views of Americans on the role of the federal government may affect American action
on climate change treaties. Looking into America’s history, one can see that the first
three executive departments formed were State, Treasury, and War, and the leaders of
these departments, remain some of the most public in the American view and some of the
most powerful. Together they hold the fourth through seventh positions in the
presidential line of succession.
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In addition to holding a significant degree of prestige among both the policy
making community and the public at large, these leaders head programs that are
traditionally well funded in the American government. The enacted 2010 federal budget
includes $683.7 billion for security agencies, with by far the most significant amount
going to the Department of Defense ($530.8 billion). Significant sums of money for
security also go to the Department of State ($50.6 billion) and the Department of
Homeland Security ($39.4 billion) (Executive Office of the President of the United States
2010).
The presence of these departments at the forefront of the American scene has the
potential to affect American views regarding policy and the role of the federal
government. National security, international relations, and the economy are consistently
considered some of the nation’s highest priorities. When processing many of these
international treaties, people will be inclined to look to the federal government to
prioritize the protection of the economy over the protection of the environment. If people
believe that the federal government has other priorities, programs aimed at addressing
environmental issues in general or global climate change specifically are unlikely to be
dealt with at the federal level. If states lack the resources, authority, or motivation to take
action, then no action will be taken.
However, with regards to the global climate change, there have been several cases
where states have chosen to take action by themselves. The most notable actions taken
by a single state have been those taken by California, which produces 6.2% of the
nation’s greenhouse gases. In 2006, the state passed AB 32, or the Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2006. The program institutes a system of cap and trade for a number of
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commercial activities. Additionally, the state seeks to decrease transportation emissions,
and improve energy efficiency, all as part of an effort to reduce emissions in the state to
1990 levels, or 15 percent below 2009 levels (California Environmental Protection
Agency 2008).
In addition to actions by individual states, a number of states have formed a
coalition aimed at addressing greenhouse gas emissions. The Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI) is a program in which ten states in the eastern United States, from
Maine to Maryland, have joined together to work towards the goal of reducing their
combined greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent. In addition to the member states,
Pennsylvania and several Canadian provinces have signed on to the program as
observers. The program uses a cap and trade system, and each state has capped
emissions in the power production sector. The states then distribute a certain number of
emissions allowances to those power plants within their state. This distribution is
primarily done through a series of auctions held four times each year. The plants can
then buy and sell emissions among themselves. Additionally, the funds raised through
auctions serve to support programs that promote energy efficiency. Programs such as the
California Global Warming Solutions Act and RGGI seem to suggest that Americans are
more willing to have states take action on global climate change, while leaving the
federal government to serve its traditional roles (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
2007).
But there seems to be more influencing the American political system than
maintaining a unilateralist precedent and upholding traditional power centers. It has been
argued that Americans are skeptical of scientists and a scientific agenda, which is
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perceived as elitist. Divisions within the scientific community are seen as signs of
weakness in the authority of scientific judgment as the public views scientific debate as a
sign that no absolute statements can be made on the matter. This was particularly evident
following the November 2009 release of emails from the Climatic Research Unit at the
University of East Anglia. Critics seized upon gaps in understanding and conversations
within the community as evidence that global climate change was not occurring rather
than as internal discussions among scientists (Johnson 2009).
Furthermore, the views of scientists come under inherent scrutiny because of their
role as an elite segment of society, particularly because as a demographic, scientist tend
to be white middle class males (Jamieson 1996). Recent debates over breast cancer
screening, vaccines, and epidemic preparedness, demonstrate that American anti-elitism
plays a role in congressional and public discourse, as reports of bodies of experts have
been disregarded or attacked as being out of touch with the views and needs of the
masses, regardless of their scientific validity. It has been determined that journalists view
“antiestablishment” scientists as more trustworthy than their mainstream counterparts
(Rothman and Lichter 1987). In dealing with nuclear power, it was determined that
members of the public are willing to believe that the threats that they face are due to the
actions of government and industry, suggesting that they believe that governmental and
economic elites are actively pursuing projects that work against them (Horowitz 1967).
This mistrust has the potential to undercut the governing ability of those in power and
prevent any action from being taken on an issue (Damico, Conway, and Damico 2000).
Skepticism of scientific results comes from two places, the first being a general
mistrust in the American elite, most clearly manifested in distrust of American
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governmental leaders. Since the mid-twentieth century, there has been an
underwhelming amount of trust placed in political leaders and institutions by the
American people (Damico, Conway, and Damico 2000). According to an April 2010 Pew
Survey, 52 percent of Americans feel that the governmental system works, but that the
people who are part of it are a problem (Pew 2010). In a bid to gain office and political
capital, leaders in the party out of power seek to distance themselves from the ruling
party and make themselves appear as “outsiders,” individuals who are uninfluenced by
the perceived scheming of Washington and who understand the true needs of the people.
This makes sense as only 27 percent of the population feels that most members of
Congress should be reelected (Pew 2010). The easiest way to achieve this goal is by
challenging the view of those perceived to be part of the elite class that is out of touch
with the people. This was particularly evident in the December 2009 debates on breast
cancer screening legislation. Senators on both sides of the aisle repeatedly stated that
they did not want “experts” making health care decisions for individuals who knew what
was best for them (Congressional Record 2009).
Arguing that a significant portion of popular views stems from cues given by
elites, both those in and out of power, authors have presented the idea that when political
leaders challenge expert opinion, the general public is significantly more likely to
question these views (Darmofal 2005). Looking at the speeches of Senator James Inhofe
of Oklahoma, the senior Republican member of the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works, organizations such as the IPCC have been repeatedly linked to “elite
circles” such as the Obama administration (Congressional Record 2005b, 2006).
Comments like this reshape the discussion of global climate change from one about
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science to one about political power and change the perception of researchers from
trusted scientists to untrustworthy elites.
These three major theories draw on historical examples and political parallels to
come up with explanations for why America has failed to sign or ratify many of the
treaties that have come out of the UNFCCC. In addition to these three theories, there are
a number of other proposed explanations. These tend to point to very specific aspects of
American culture, which tend not to be popularly discussed, such as America’s culture of
consumption and the tendency of Americans to oppose nuclear power. Other cases
assume that a number of individual aspects of American society have helped shape
American policy decisions. Although the validity of these theories will not be assessed in
depth, in large part because of the difficulty of obtaining empirical data, one in particular
is worth addressing.
From the development of the mass-produced Model T to the modern era, the
American public, political culture, and economy have been inexorably tied to the
automobile. As suburbs grew the need and desire for an automobile became the more
important as a suburban house and a personal car became the ultimate status symbol.
Today, America has the largest number of cars in use in the world, as well as the greatest
length of roadways (International Road Federation 2009). In modern America, the
personal car has been romanticized and is seen as the ultimate symbol of individual
freedom, according to Robert Lang, Director of the Metropolitan Institute at Virginia
Tech (Hargreaves 2008). According to the Energy Information Administration, in 2008,
33.1 percent of America’s CO2 emissions came from transportation (U.S. Energy
Information Administration 2009).

24

The American automobile industry has long been a major player in global climate
change discussions, with all of the “big three” car makers represented in Kyoto (Brown
2002). Additionally, included in the testimony for the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on International Economic Policy’s hearings on the Byrd-Hagel
Resolution was W. David Montgomery, of Charles River’s Associates, a consulting firm
whose clients include the American Automobile Manufacturers Association (U.S.
Congress 1997). As a significant part of American culture and a major economic
powerhouse, particularly in the late 1990s, the automobile industry has the potential to
affect any American policy that could be related to it. The American people, who do not
want to have regulations forced on their vehicles, might object to any policy that they
might see as infringing on their right to drive, either directly through limiting vehicles or
indirectly by affecting fuel prices.
This was made clear in a 1978 Department of Transportation survey. Even with
gas prices regularly hitting record highs, Americans were still largely unwilling to change
their transportation habits (U.S. Department of Transportation 1978; hereafter DOT).
When asked about what type of changes they expected Americans to make over the next
five year, respondents favored changes. Of those that favored changes, most favored
exploration of new energy sources, while only 4 percent felt that there should be more
government “controls on auto manufactures and encouragement of energy saving autos”
(DOT 1978, 5). Additionally, even following a massive energy crisis, 71 percent of the
population felt that Americans would rely on their automobiles either the same amount or
more in the future (DOT 1978, 6).
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This is simply not the case in much of the rest of the world. In March of 2008,
Americans paid an average of $3.45 per gallon of gasoline. Although this was high by
America’s historical standards, it was one of the lowest gases prices in the world at the
time. Much of this has to do with taxes on gasoline. During the second quarter of 2005,
Americans paid $2.01 per gallon of gasoline. On average $0.45 of this was paid as
federal or state taxes. In contrast, in France at this time, an average gallon of gasoline
cost $5.53, of which $3.77 was paid as taxes. Similarly, in Turkey buyers were paying
$4.93 in taxes alone for each gallon of gasoline that they bought (Hoo and Ebel 2005).
American views on transportation are very clear. As the Department of
Transportation report states “These results make it clear how central the automobile is to
the American system of transportation” (DOT 1978, 10). The elites are clearly aware of
this. Under Zaller’s model of elite-public interaction, this provides an example of a
situation where government action is influenced by what it anticipates public response to
be (Zaller 1992, 270). The government is unlikely to take any action aimed at addressing
global climate change that is likely to be perceived as having an impact on Americans’
cars. As transportation accounts for a large percentage of America’s CO2 emissions, this
may decrease the likelihood that American elites will endorse policies that mandate CO2
reductions. A 1998 Department of Energy Study, predicted substantial increases in
gasoline prices would occur if Kyoto were implemented and the government were to
limit carbon emissions (U.S. Energy Information Agency 1998). Perhaps ironically, all
of their predictions were lower than the actual increase in gas prices that occurred over
the next decade.
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In this example, it is made clear that America’s policy decisions are driven by
both the views of those who directly affect the policy making process and by the mass
public. Additionally, the interactions between these groups can also shape the policy
making process. The remainder of this paper will seek to examine how well the three
political traditions and cultural views outlined in this chapter can be said to determine the
decisions made by each of these groups in determining America’s foreign policy on
global climate change. Although it is unlikely that any one of these factors can be held
solely accountable, as over three-hundred million people contribute to the views of the
nation, an analysis of there relative impacts make help future policy makers better
understand how America sets its course.
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III. THE MASS PUBLIC
American views on unilateralism are complicated at best as the concept of
unilateralism has very different practical implications when applied to environmental
issues than when it is applied to waging war. An examination of the degree to which the
unilateralist tradition influences the American masses in determining their views on
environmental treaties can be done in two distinct ways: first, by comparing American
support for unilateral efforts to stem global climate change to their support for
international efforts to achieve the same goal, and second, by examining the public’s
support for other comparable international measures.
A 2009 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press
found that 57 percent of the population felt that the Earth was getting warmer. Polls over
the prior three years consistently put this number between 70 and 80 percent. Similarly,
only 36 percent of the population felt that the earth was getting warmer “mostly because
of human activity,” compared to 40 to 50 percent over the prior three years. However, at
the same time 56 percent of the population felt that “the United States should join other
countries in setting standards to address global climate change,” while 32 percent felt that
“the United States should set its own standards to address global climate change” (Pew
2009c). This seems to indicate that on the whole, Americans would favor entering into
treaties aimed at addressing global climate change, yet a minority believes that humans
are causing the earth to warm.
Historically, however, this case cannot be made as strongly, as more people saw
unilateralist action as a way of addressing the issue. In 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol
was adopted, 55 percent of the population felt the United States should join with other
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countries, and 41 percent of the population felt that the United States should set its own
standards (Pew 2009c). As there were no specific treaties being popularly discussed in
2009, and there were in 1997, this data may be interpreted in several different ways.
First, the influence of the unilateralist tradition has declined in the United States over the
past decade. Second, the unilateralist tradition plays little if any role in determining the
public’s views on global climate change treaties, and they are more driven by the
specifics of the treaty. Third, Wilsonian ideals of global cooperation prevail when there
are no specific policy consequences, but when there is a real treaty being discussed that
has practical implications, the unilateralist tradition becomes more influential.
Given that no particular objections have been made to arrangements like the APP,
which do not have specific caps or limitations, and are therefore less likely to affect the
industry and economy of the nation or have any direct impact on the daily lives of its
citizens, it seems that unilateralism cannot be used to explain, to any substantial degree,
the views of the American masses with regards to treaties aimed at addressing global
climate change. However, in those specific cases, such as the Kyoto Protocol, where the
United States would be committed specific policy changes, it is possible that the
unilateralist threshold is passed and the public rejects the treaty.
The views of the American masses on global climate change treaties can also be
assessed by comparing them to their views on other major treaties. In other cases,
Americans have been less likely than their peers to approve of international treaties. The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides an example of this. Although
ratified by the American Senate, this trade treaty, which took effect in 1994, has been
opposed by large segments of the American population. A December 2008 Gallup poll
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found that 53 percent of Americans felt that the treaty had had a “mainly negative” effect
on the American population, while only 37 percent felt that the treaty had had a “mainly
positive” effect. In contrast, in Mexico, the population was roughly split, and in Canada,
the third nation involved in the agreement, a majority of the population felt that it had had
a mainly positive effect (Gallup 2008).
Regardless of the influence of the unilateralist tradition, the views of the masses,
with regard to the traditional roles of federal government, also need to be considered. It
has already been determined that certain executive departments receive substantially
more press and funding than others. Similarly, when asked to rank what they thought
should be priorities for the President and Congress in 2009, respondents to a January
2009 Pew poll ranked “Dealing with global warming” at the bottom of twenty options.
Only 30 percent felt it should be a top priority, compared to 85 percent who felt that
strengthening the nation’s economy should be a top priority and 76 percent who felt that
defending the country from future terrorist attacks should be a top priority. Dealing with
global climate change was first included in the list of priorities asked about in 2007, when
it ranked eighteenth out of twenty. The next year, it fell to the bottom of the list.
Additionally in 2009, 10 percent of the population felt that “Dealing with global
warming” was something that “should not be done.” These data seems to strongly
indicate that the American people feel that the federal government has significantly
higher priorities than addressing global warming (Pew 2009a).
Part of this may be due to risk assessment. Individuals make decisions about
risks, not based on percentages, but on characteristics of the risk. If global climate
change is occurring, the mechanism of the change would be understood, its effects would
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be delayed, occurring well after any increased emissions occurred, and the risk would be
spread largely equally throughout the population. All of these are factors that decrease
public concern about this issue (National Research Council 1989). Most Americans do
not believe that global climate change will have an impact within their life times, and do
not view recent natural disasters as being caused by global warming. This percentage has
also been increasing over the past several years as fewer Americans believe that global
climate change will have effects in their life time (Gallup 2010). In contrast, people can
see job loss from a recession and deaths from terrorist attacks occurring immediately.
Additionally, these types of threats harm readily countable and identifiable groups.
When a single group of individuals is harmed or threatened, for example autoworkers or
the passengers on an airplane, the public views the risk with greater concern (National
Research Council 1989). These factors in addition to historical precedence, might
contribute to the greater weight placed on security issues and economic issues at the
federal level. When a treaty that has both environmental and economic implications
enters the public awareness, it seems that the economic implications are examined and
the environmental implications are seen as secondary, as Americans are more likely than
their global peers to prioritize economic growth over environmental protection (The Pew
Global Attitude Project 2009).
Additionally, in allocating authority in a federal system, there is a complex system
of competition to determine who exercises authority. An efficient system is one where
authority on a particular matter is clearly assigned to either the federal or the state
government (Volden 2005). However, in cases where states have a wide variety of needs
and opinions but are not highly efficient at dealing with the issue, there is going to be
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competition between state and national authorities, as each attempts to address the issue,
but neither is capable of fully solving the policy problem (Volden 2005). The states
cannot, because they lack the authority or resources, and the federal government cannot,
because they face internal divisions that prevent a policy from being decided upon.
This seems to be the case with global climate change. States cannot deal with the
issue in a highly efficient manner, because the problem is both an interstate and
international one. If one state were to unilaterally ban any greenhouse gas emissions, the
businesses involved would relocate to another state with less stringent guidelines. This
would likely have little effect on the total international emissions, and would not help
address the issue in the state that took the original action.
At the same time, different states clearly have different outlooks towards global
warming. The previously cited October 2009 Pew poll found that beliefs about global
climate change varied based on region. In the West and Northeast, 53 percent and 51
percent of the population respectively felt that the earth was getting warmer primarily
through human activity. In contrast, in the South and Midwest, this number was 43
percent and 44 percent respectively. This is significant when one realizes that the West
and Northeast are those areas where states have been taking action to address global
climate change, through programs like RGGI and AB 32. These differences may be due
to differences in local industries or differing demographics between regions. Areas with
heavy coal production and oil production tend to view global climate change as a less
serious problem, and age, education, and religiosity have all been linked to differing
views on global climate change (Pew 2009b). However, political affiliation remains the
strongest predictor of views on global climate change (Pew 2006).
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If states were highly efficient at dealing with climate change issues, then they
would hold all of the authority, and if all states had similar needs and views on the issue,
the federal government would hold all of the authority. This is not the case. Instead, it
seems that because American views vary based on region, and because states are unable
to take effective action on a single state basis, there is ongoing competition between the
federal government and state governments when it comes to setting national policy on
global climate change. This is in stark contrast with issues like defense and the national
economy, where historical precedent has placed power clearly in the hands of the federal
government. Like global climate change, defense and economic issues are inherently
challenging to address at the state level, but unlike global climate change, public views
on these matters are much more aligned. Almost everyone wants a strong economy and
to be safe from foreign aggression and terrorism.
It is also important to distinguish the views held in United States from those held
in the rest of the world. Elsewhere, economic growth and national security are also
viewed as issues to be dealt with by the federal government, but in many other states,
global climate change becomes an issue under federal authority. In some cases this may
simply be the result of a unitary system, as is the case in countries like France, where
there is no competition between national and sub national authorities, because all
authority rests with the national government. In other cases, this may be the result of
differing views of national priorities. As a July 2009, Pew Global Attitudes Project poll
found, 64 percent of Americans believe that “protecting the environment should be given
priority, even if it causes slower growth and some loss of jobs.” Although this is handily
a majority, significantly more people hold this view in countries such as Germany and
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Canada, where 77 and 76 percent of the population have this attitude (The Pew Global
Attitude Project 2009).
All of this seems to indicate that people in the United States consider the federal
government to be responsible for dealing primarily with the traditional issues of defense
and the economy, while no level of government has clear authority over global climate
change. Instead, due to variations in regional views and the inherent inability of state
governments to deal with the issue global climate change, the issue is being dealt with by
both federal and state governments, but neither clearly holds the reins of authority. If the
American people as a whole decide that global climate change should be a federal matter,
it is more likely to be dealt with at the federal level. However, this is unlikely to happen,
because there are other policy issues that are entrenched as federal priorities in the
American mindset, and the public views on global climate change differ by region,
making it hard to achieve the super majority in the Senate that is necessary to ratify a
treaty.
In addition to the addressing these questions about how the American political
system addresses global climate change, an investigation of the role that American
skepticism and mistrust of the elites play in affecting the views of Americans with
regards to global climate change is needed. This will be examined by first looking at
American trust in public officials, then examining their trust in the scientific community,
and finally seeing if the degree of faith that Americans put into the scientific community
affects their beliefs about global climate change and how science is used in the policy
making and political arenas.
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From the 1970s through the 1990s, less than 10 percent of the American people
felt that they could trust the government to do what is right “just about always.” Instead,
an overwhelming and consistent majority has stated that they trust the government to do
what is right only “sometimes” (Damico 2000). This fundamental lack of trust may be
symptomatic of a larger distrust of the elites who are directly affecting the American
policy making process.
At the same time, however, 70 percent of Americans say that scientists contribute
“a lot” to society’s well-being, which ranks them above medical doctors, engineers, and
clergy among others. Furthermore, 84 percent of the population believes that science has
a mostly positive effect on society, while only 6 percent say that science has a mostly
negative effect (Pew 2009b). This seems to suggest that Americans are clearly proscience, so they would be willing to support the scientific community’s views on global
climate change, regardless of the tradition of anti-elitism. Problems arise with this case,
however, when one compares the views of the general public with views of the scientific
community. On the whole, the American public is less likely than American scientists to
view the nation’s scientific achievements as being the best in the world, suggesting that
there is a disconnect between the values and judgments of America’s scientific
community and the nation at large.
This attitude is generally accepted in the scientific community, where 85 percent
of scientists view it as a major problem that the “public does not know very much about
science.” Furthermore, media influences seem to result in the masses developing a
perception of what is generally accepted as scientific authority in the scientific
community, which differs significantly from what scientists themselves view as
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authoritative. In fact, 76 percent of scientists feel that it is a major problem that “news
does not distinguish between well-founded findings and those that ate not,” and 48
percent of scientists feel that it is a major problem that “news media oversimplify
scientific findings” (Pew 2009b). Furthermore, studies of journalistic reporting on
nuclear power have found that reporters are more likely to interview scientists who
disagree with the established scientific community (Rothman and Lichter 1987).
When dealing directly with the scientific community, it seems that the public has
generally positive feelings about it, but is generally ill-informed about the scientific
community’s stance on issues, in part because there is no direct connection between the
two groups. Instead, most communication takes place through the news media, with the
possible involvement of public leaders, which raises the question of how their views and
agenda’s influence American’s perceptions of global climate change.
However, science inherently involves a certain degree of uncertainty. Without it
there can be no progress, as questions need to be asked in order to be answered and no
scientific experiment can account for all variables. Yet the public is distrustful of this
uncertainty, which it perceives as a lack of truthfulness or confidence. From the public’s
perspective, debate within the scientific community over global climate change may be
seen as a sign that the issue is largely in question, or that scientists are attempting to
mislead the public, rather than a as a natural part of the scientific process. This seems to
be the case with global climate change. The majority of the scientific community seems
to agree that it is a problem, but the public as a whole does not. This was clearly
illustrated in the June 2009 Pew poll which found that 84 percent of scientists thought
that the Earth was warming over time due to human action, while only 49 percent of the
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general public felt the same way. The same poll found that only 56 percent of the general
public thought that “scientists general agree that the earth is getting warmer because of
human activity,” when it is clear that the vast majority of the scientific community agrees
with that assessment (Pew 2009b).
This perceived uncertainty gives rise to two different methods of addressing an
issue. One view says that an action should not be taken if it may cause significant harm,
and the other says that an action should not be prohibited unless it can be shown to cause
significant harm (Jamieson 1996). In the debate over global climate change this is clear,
as some argue that the potential destruction of humankind that could result makes action
necessary, and others claim that this is not yet clear, so no action should be taken to
address global climate change that would cause harm to other aspects of human life,
notably, the economy.
This may be accentuated by the role that policy makers play in influencing mass
opinion. Most citizens do not have the time or background knowledge necessary to make
independent assessments of major policy issues. As a result they often rely on the
opinions expressed by elites in order to develop their views on these issues. When
political leaders disagree with expert opinion, the masses are likely to follow, and in
cases where one or both of the major political parties make exaggerated claims, people
are more inclined to follow the cues of the party that they trust more (Darmofal 2005).
This is clearly the case with the debate over global climate change. There is a definitive
party divide when Americans are asked about whether they think humans are causing
global warming and when they are asked to examine global climate change as a priority
for government. In 2006, 54 percent of Democrats believed that global warming is

37

occurring and is due to human activity, and only 24 percent of Republicans felt the same
way (Pew 2006).
What this seems to indicate is that, although Americans place an enormous
amount of trust in scientists, they have a distorted image of what the scientific
community believes in. This is due in part to a lack of education on scientific matters,
and a media that seeks to highlight controversy rather than accentuate agreement.
Furthermore, the issue of global climate change seems to have become a political one,
resulting in a questioning of experts, who endorse the theory of anthropogenic climate
change.
When taken as a whole, this examination of the views of the masses with regards
to global climate change and America’s role in treaties aimed at addressing global
climate change presents an interesting picture. It seems that Americans want to approach
these treaties with a Wilsonian attitude, leading the world through engagement, but when
presented with a specific treaty that has clear limits on emissions, the unilateralist
tradition becomes dominant. In addition to this, it seems that America’s regional
divisions with regards to global climate change prevent it from becoming a federal
priority. It is possible that this is due to the federalist nature of the American
government. All of these factors suggest that while political tradition and culture may
play some role in shaping the American public’s views on involvement in global climate
change pacts, it seems that no single factor can be held entirely responsible.
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IV. THE ELITES
Views of the American elite on global climate change can be assessed in a similar
manner. However, they also can be more directly addressed by examining speeches and
prominent opinion pieces written by leading figures in the debate. As has been
mentioned several times previously, the relationship between the views expressed by
political and societal leaders have a complex relationship with the views of the masses,
both influencing them and being influenced by them. Additionally, it is important to note
the distinction between those members of the elite who are directly involved in the
political process and those who are not.
In the same manner as the masses, America’s elite have made decisions about
their views on global climate change and America’s involvement in treaties aimed at
addressing the issue. A number of key leaders are involved in the process, each of whose
views can be examined in different ways. As the United States Senate is responsible for
ratifying all treaties, of particular importance are the leadership of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, which has jurisdiction over treaties, the Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources, and the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works. Additionally, there are members of the executive branch and outspoken
journalists and scientists who have made their views on global climate change treaties
known. In seeking to understand why these treaties are opposed, the following will focus
primarily on opponents of global climate change treaties.
With the exception of a few groups that are generally seen as out of the
mainstream, it seems that few members of the elite have centered their arguments against
global climate change treaties in the tradition of unilateralism. However, members of the
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foreign policy elite have been shown to have an even stronger belief in American
exceptionalism than the public as a whole. According to a 2009 Pew survey, 92 percent
of the members of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a cross section of America’s
foreign policy elite, felt that America should have a shared leadership role in the world,
but 62 percent of the total felt that America should be the most assertive nation in that
system of shared leadership. Additionally, less than 1 percent of the members of the CFR
felt that the United States should have no leadership role, while 11 percent of the general
public held that view (Pew 2009d). This does not, however, translate into isolationism or
unilateralism. In stark contrast with the general public, 88 percent of the members of the
CFR felt that free trade agreements where a good thing for the United States, and
members of the CFR were significantly more likely to list climate change as a top priority
for American policy (Pew 2009d). This seems to suggest that in general, members of the
foreign policy elite believe that the United States should work with other nations to
address issues like global climate change, but the United States should lead the
discussion.
As the former chair and now ranking member of the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) has been one of the most
vocal critics of treaties aimed at addressing global climate change. His views on how the
United States should interact with the international community to address global climate
change differ significantly from those suggested by the Pew data. Occasionally he
mentions possible ulterior motives behind the treaty, often going back to a November 20,
2000 speech given by then French President Jacque Chirac, who in an address to the
Conference of Parties to the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC referred to
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the Kyoto Protocol as “the first component of an authentic global governance.” In both
January of 2005 and September of 2006, Senator Inhofe referred to the speech in floor
statements given to criticize proponents of global climate change, arguing that it serves as
a clue to why the international community supports the Kyoto Protocol (Congressional
Record 2005, 2006). In doing so, he links the Kyoto Protocol to a system of global
governance, which in the context of the speeches is an inherently bad proposition.
Although this never seems to be the primary case made by the Senator, it frequently
serves as an ancillary argument.
Senator Inhofe also builds on this distrust of other nations, by framing the Kyoto
Protocol as an opportunity being used by other nations to take advantage of the United
States. Prior to the most recent recession, he argued that Europe saw the Kyoto Protocol
as a way of holding back the American economic machine, so that European countries
would have a change to compete. To back up this view, the Senator turned to remarks
made by former European Commissioner for the Environment Margot Wallström, and he
stated in the January 4, 2005 statement on the floor of the Senate, that:
To her, Kyoto is about "leveling the playing field" for businesses worldwide-in
other words, we can't compete, so let's use a feel-good treaty, based on shoddy
science, fear, and alarmism, and which will have no perceptible impact on the
environment … to restrict America's economic growth and prosperity.
(Congressional Record 2005a)
This argument also seems to appeal to the American tradition of unilateralism, as Senator
Inhofe argues that the treaty is really an attempt by other nations to harm the United
States, suggesting that Americans are best to act alone as they cannot trust the intentions
of other nations.
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Other prominent Senators have raised the issue of America’s own actions in less
dramatic ways. In a 2005 hearing before the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works, Senator George Voinovich (R-OH) criticized the Kyoto Protocol for not
including specific limits for developing nations and argued that America was taking
action to address global warming domestically. He then praised the AAP as an example
of American action (U.S. Congress 2005). His comments, and similarly phrased ones,
seem to suggest that members of this school of thought are more likely to support
domestic programs, or international efforts headed by the United States, while opposing
efforts that are perceived as being favorable to other nations while holding back the
United States. This, rather than Senator Inhofe’s fears of an international anti-American
agenda, seems to be more common as many individuals support groups like the AAP
which are American-led international collaborations, yet do not put real limitations on
America’s domestic actions, perhaps blending the Wilsonian concept of American
leadership with the unilateralist tradition of President Washington.
Although the idea of American independence has been brought up in discussions
of the global climate change treaties, much of the commentary of Senator Inhofe, as well
as other prominent writers and speakers, tends to focus on other issues, the foremost of
these being the government’s obligation to the economy. This is a popular view
expressed by both politicians and other commentators, and seems to match well with the
views held by the public.
Although climate change treaties may have economic implications, these
implications tend to be portrayed as negative. As a result, once the federal government
has determined that a treaty has negative economic implications, it can be rejected, as
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environmental issues are not a federal priority. This stance was articulated in the ByrdHagel Resolution, which stated that “the United States should not be a signatory to any
protocol…which would…result in serious harm to the economy of the United States”
(U.S. Congress 1997). No exceptions are provided to this rule, making it clear that
regardless of any other benefits, once a treaty has failed the economic test it is not a
federal priority.
In the previously mentioned January 4, 2005 floor statement, Senator Inhofe
attacks “Kyoto-like policies” on the grounds that they “harm Americans, especially the
poor and minorities, causing higher energy prices, reduced economic growth, and fewer
jobs,” and more recently in a general attack on claims that a green economy will help
America, journalist Robert J. Samuelson wrote of the “practical difficulties” of
“wean[ing] the U.S. economy from today's fossil fuels” in an April 27, 2009, opinion
piece in the Washington Post (Samuelson 2009). While these individuals clearly place
economic concerns over concerns related to global climate change, it is important to note
that both of these individuals also challenge the claims that global climate change can be
accepted as a scientifically verified threat to humanity, so this prioritization alone cannot
lead to the unequivocal claim that American elites oppose global climate change treaties
on the grounds that addressing environmental treaties is not a traditional role of the
federal government.
In the 2000 hearing on Kyoto, Senator Frank Murkowski (R-AK), then chair of
the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, argued that when Kyoto first was
negotiated, predictions of its potential impact on the American consumer “disturbed” him
and his staff (U.S. Congress 2000a). In a similar hearing five years later, Senator
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Thomas Carper (D-DE), who believes that global climate change is a serious threat, also
argued that the Kyoto Protocol was unrealistic, and that to protect the American
economy, slower action must be taken (U.S. Congress 2005). Unlike the previous two
commentators, both of these individuals accept the risk of global climate change and
accept human responsibility for that risk. It can be readily claimed that protecting the
American economy is the driving motivator behind their statements.
At the same time, however, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Nicholas Kristof
points out in an opinion piece in the New York Times on October 31, 2006, that “spending
on energy research and development has fallen by more than half, after inflation, since
1979” (Kristof 2006). A believer that action must be taken on global climate change,
Kristof also expresses his opinion that action is not being taken because, “Melting
glaciers and corroding pteropods1 aren't as sensational as a Congressional page scandal,
or as urgent as the Iraq war.” In his mind, scandal and security issues dominate the
American political scene, eliminating the environment from the list of Washington’s
priorities.
Moving beyond political priorities, opponents of global climate change treaties
very actively raise the issue of uncertainty in the scientific process. This argument has
been popular both in the Senate and among writers of opinion pieces. As has been
previously mentioned, in September of 2000, a joint hearing was held by the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations and the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources to examine the Kyoto Protocol three years after its negotiation. Presiding over
the meeting, Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE), remarked in his opening address that since the
initial negotiations on Kyoto new scientific information had come out calling the early
1

A type of sea snail
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predictions of global climate change inaccurate. He then took note of the “uncertainties
and complexities of the climate change question” (U.S. Congress 2000a). Senator Inhofe
has also regularly raised this argument. In numerous floor statements, he has argued that
the uncertainty in the models means that there cannot be a consensus in the scientific
community (Congressional Record 2003, 2005a, 2005b, 2006). He has instead claimed
that the scientific community and the media have been “flip-flopping between warming
and cooling scares” (Congressional Record 2006)
This opposition on the grounds of uncertainty has over time come from both sides
of the aisle. In the 2000 hearing on Kyoto, Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM) argued that
there was no consensus as to the extent of the impact of human activity on global climate
change (U.S. Congress 2000a). On his website, Senator Mike Crapo (R-ID) states that
“but the underlying cause of these climactic shifts is ultimately not well-understood and
is a matter of vigorous debate” (Crapo 2008).
Elsewhere in government, Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global
Affairs during the second Bush administration, and head of the American Delegation to
the 10th Conference of Parties held in Buenos Aires in 2004, has been quoted by Senator
Inhofe as saying, “Science tells us that we cannot say with any certainty what constitutes
a dangerous level of warming, and therefore what level must be avoided” (Congressional
Record 2005a). This has been taken by some, including Senator Inhofe, to mean that no
action should be taken. Since leaving government Dobriansky has been active in
promoting alternative methods of addressing global climate change including
reforestation as a method of carbon sequestration.
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Outside of government, prominent writers have expressed the same opinion.
Robert Samuelson writes in his previously mentioned opinion piece that “…no one
involved in this debate really knows what the consequences or costs might be. All are
inferred from models of uncertain reliability” (Samuelson 2009), and Emily Yoffe, a
writer for Slate, writes in the January 25, 2007, Washington Post that, “There is so much
hubris in the certainty about the models of the future that I'm oddly reassured. We've seen
how hubristic predictions about complicated, unpredictable events have a way of bringing
the predictors low” (Yoffe 2007).
There are of course those who argue that the uncertainty is acceptable and the
models on the whole can be accepted, such as Thomas Homer-Dixon, of the Centre for
International Governance Innovation Chair of Global Systems at the Balsillie School of
International Affairs, who in an October 4, 2007, opinion piece in the New York Times
argued that scientists can be trusted to do a good job at making these predictions, even if
the models are not yet perfect (Homer-Dixon 2007). Similarly in 2001, Senator John
Kerry (MA-D) argued that waiting to take action until the science was certain could mean
waiting until any damage done was irreversible (Congressional Record 2001). On the
other side of the aisle, in a 2006 statement, Senator John McCain (R-AZ), stated “that the
science we are relying upon is wrong,” but he expressed his support for taking action on
global climate change, because even if the models were not perfect, global warming
could still be occurring, and limiting emissions and promoting new technologies had the
potential to improve air quality and the economy, regardless of the status of global
climate change (McCain 2006).
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However, those members of the elite who support models of global climate
change that result in disaster for humanity tend not to be those who are opposing treaties
aimed at addressing the problem. Additionally, looking to the motivation behind these
decisions, it is important to note that making the claim that the science being used to
justify anthropogenic climate change is uncertain is different from attacking the science
because it is being espoused by a segment of the population that is perceived as elitist. In
most of these cases, the attack being made is not overtly about scientists being part of an
elite group that is out of touch with the public.
Yet, in addition to attacking the uncertainty in the global climate change model,
opponents have attacked advocates of the model for both being overly political and for
being out of touch with the population at large. In an October 4, 2004, floor statement by
Senator Inhofe, he states “Today's environmental groups are simply Democrat political
machines with millions of dollars in contributions and expenditures each year for the
purpose of raising more money to pursue their agenda.” Three months later he stated, “I
called the threat of catastrophic global warming the "greatest hoax ever perpetrated on the
American people," a statement that, to put it mildly, was not viewed kindly by
environmental extremists and their elitist organizations.” (Congressional Record 2004)
These statements seem to indicate that the Senator, and possibly other members of the
policy making apparatus, feel that climate change treaties and the concept of global
climate change as whole, are being perpetuated by an elite group within society that is
furthermore tied to a particular political body.
While this may at first seem like a purely rhetorical attack, it may have some
actual grounding. According to the previously mentioned June 2009 Pew survey, while

47

64 percent of Americans view scientists as being neither politically liberal or politically
conservative, 56 percent of scientists view their demographic as being politically liberal.
Furthermore, 55 percent of scientists identify themselves as being affiliated with the
Democratic Party, and 81 percent say that they are either Democrats or lean towards the
Democratic Party (Pew 2009b). This presents a complicated situation. On one hand,
Senator Inhofe’s arguments may appear to be strengthened by this, as it seems likely that
on particularly political issues, scientists may have a party bias. On the other hand, it
could be that scientists move away from the Republican Party because they perceive it to
be intolerant of their work, a fact that is hinted at in the same survey, where 77 percent of
scientists believed claims made during the Bush administration about government
scientists not being able to report results that conflicted with the administration’s stance
were true.
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V. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
After decades of debate, the issue of global climate change policy is still a
complex one, particularly in the United States, where policy has been determined through
a system that involves members of the masses, state government, federal government,
and the scientific community. It is clear that within each of these groups there is at least
some division on what policy the federal government should pursue as it works with
other nations to address the issue of global climate change. However, understanding how
these groups affect each other and what aspects of American political history affect
various segments of the population may help future policy makers set a course for
America and the rest of the world.
From its earliest days, America has been reserved in entering complex treaty
systems, particularly when they are developed by other nations. Although this has clearly
affected the debate surrounding global climate change treaties, it is unlikely that it has
been a determining factor in preventing American ratification. While Americans
appreciate the nation’s unilateralism, other factors seem to raise passions much more
effectively and are cited far more frequently by the elites. However, tied as it is to the
tradition of American exceptionalism that traces to the founding of the republic, the
unilateralist tradition is a powerful if latent influence in this debate.
In addressing the role that the federal government plays in dealing with issues
related to global climate change, it is clear that, unlike many other issues, it does not have
absolute authority in a practical sense. Although the federal government has the authority
to address international and interstate relations, neither federal leaders nor the masses
view addressing global climate change as a priority. For action to be taken, both the
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masses and the elites need to come to view the question as an economic or national
security one. When global climate change treaties are framed as economic questions,
significant members of both the masses and the elites often frame it as being harmful to
the American economy. Although some individuals have tried to frame global climate
change treaties as ultimately benefiting the American economy (Congressional Record
2001, McCain 2006), to date this has not been done effectively with global climate
change, and the masses and the majority of the elites view treaties like the Kyoto Protocol
as threatening some of the established priorities of the federal government, notably
economic ones.
Finally, although it is clear that Americans distrust those that they perceive as
being members of the elite, this distrust does not necessarily apply to scientists. Instead,
it seems that Americans are skeptical of the scientific consensus on global warming not
because they mistrust scientists, but instead because there is a disconnect between the
scientific community and the masses. This disconnect seems to be due in part to a media
bias that tends to focus on divisions in the community rather than those areas where there
is general agreement.
Although American anti-elitist sentiment does not seem to be affecting the debate
through scientists, anti-elitism still plays a role in the debate, but it is in a very different
context. Opponents of global climate change treaties, particularly Republicans, have
sought to use the debate as a way of attacking those interests that they oppose politically.
By framing the issue as one where Democrats and their elitist allies are trying to
manipulate the American people using flawed science, they have made global climate
change a political issue, playing off bias that views government and industry as working
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without the best interests of the people in mind. This may be an extension of the
relationship between the masses and the elites, which tends to polarize issues and force
parties to take opposing stances on issue.
All of these factors will play a role in influencing America’s future decisions
regarding international treaties aimed at addressing global climate change. President
Obama’s administration has made it clear that it would like to take action to address
global climate change, which the administration considers to be a real threat facing
America. At the same time, speaking at the December 2009 United Nations Climate
Change Conference in Copenhagen, which also served as the Fifteenth Conference of
Parties to the UNFCCC, President Obama made it clear that he does not consider a
simple extension of the Kyoto Protocol to be acceptable. Like many before him he points
to the failures of European states to meet their targets, and he argues that developing
countries need to be more involved in the process, stating “It’s not enough just for the
developed countries to make changes,” while acknowledging that both sides in he
developing country discussion have legitimate points (Executive Office of the President
of the United States 2009).
Out of the Copenhagen Conference came the highly controversial Copenhagen
Accord. This American-led proposal, which was noted but not adopted by the
Conference of Parties, focused on technological advancements, reforestation, and aid to
developing nations to help them decrease their emissions. It holds no legally binding
status, and has been opposed by many nations for being too slow and not setting any real
targets for emissions cuts (Copenhagen climate summit held to ransom - Gordon Brown
2009; hereafter Copenhagen). Additionally, the Accord was developed by only a small
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group of countries present at the Conference, and many European countries that were not
involved in its development view it as a step backwards in the global community’s
attempt to address climate change (Copenhagen 2009).
Given these facts and the nature of American’s political system, certain
conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the treaties aimed at addressing global
climate change that the United States is likely to ratify. Many of the characteristics of a
treaty likely to be ratified by the United States are seen in the Copenhagen Accord, which
suggests that such a treaty will be a controversial one globally and will be unlikely to
develop the global support held by the Kyoto Protocol.
Any treaty ratified is likely going to be initiated by the United States. Americans
seem to prefer programs that they develop. This could be because they like to maintain
the feeling that they are leading the world, or it could be because they share the view of
Senator Inhofe, and believe that any treaty developed by foreign powers has a hidden
anti-American agenda and will benefit other nations at the expense of the United States.
Additionally, at this point, most European nations have moved beyond the type of treaties
that the United States is comfortable with. Although they might be willing to sign an
American initiated treaty, they are unlikely to propose some of the measures that would
be needed to get American approval. Similarly, many of the developing nations that have
become influential in the world political arena have demonstrated that while they are
willing to become involved in political mechanisms, like Kyoto and the APP, they have
no interest in initiating them themselves.
Notable among the American requirements for a treaty aimed at addressing
greenhouse gas emissions would be a lack of binding emissions caps. At the federal
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level, binding caps are perceived as harmful to the American economy. Instead, it seems
that the elites who have successfully prevented America’s entrance into any treaty with
binding caps have favored non-binding emissions targets and technological efforts aimed
at reducing emissions.
In the event that targets are proposed, the system devised must be viewed as fair.
Developing a system for setting levels of reduction for emissions that can be universally
accepted proves a unique challenge. A balance must be found between the demands of
developing nations who feel that they should face less stringent limits on emissions
because the rest of the world has already polluted at their expense, and they should be
given the opportunity to expand, and nations like the United States who are opposed to
putting caps on some nations but not others. Additionally, a system of targets must not
be seen as biased toward any group of nations.
Finally, for a treaty to receive American approval, it cannot contain explicit
acknowledgment of anthropogenic climate change. In the United States, discussions of
the science behind climate change have become highly politicized, with the sides tending
to break down along party lines. For a treaty to succeed, it must bypass this discussion.
Instead, a treaty ratified by the United States would most likely base itself in economics
and technological innovation, giving minimal word space to environmental issues. These
are ideas that are prioritized by Americans and are widely accepted by the public as
reasons for change. This may be the reason behind the success of programs like the APP,
which focus on technological innovation rather than emissions.
Given the different demands of nations at the negotiating table, it is unlikely that
another treaty will emerge that holds the same international weight symbolically or
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politically as the Kyoto Protocol has. Instead, it is likely that groups of nations will
develop systems for addressing global climate change that are suited to meet the demands
of the group, rather than the global community, as no global consensus seems to be
emerging, particularly as developed nations put more pressure on their developing
counterparts to agree to binding limits on emissions.
In time, the true nature of global climate change is likely to be revealed, and
action will likely be taken with or without American involvement. If the United States
wants to retain its status as a global leader, American policy makers must understand
what is driving the nation’s decisions and must effectively convey the people’s concerns
and needs to the global community. At the same time, the United States must not destroy
the ties that it has to other nations and must be willing to reach a compromise on matters
that the world sees as important. Hopefully an improved understanding of how America
is making its decisions on global climate change treaties will help to mediate that process.
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